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Livelihood strategies of cacao producers in Ecuador: Effects of 




This study identifies the livelihood strategies pursued by small cacao farmers in the Guayas 
coastal region in Ecuador, where two distinct cacao varieties are grown: the fine flavor variety, 
Cacao Nacional (CN), and a hybrid variety (CCN-51). Enhancing CN production is regarded as 
an economic development strategy since CN variety beans are characterized by premium prices 
in international markets. This study aims to assess the trade-offs faced by small cacao producers 
in the production of specialty (CN) vs. commodity (CCN-51) cacao and how they affect their 
livelihoods. A detailed household survey sampled 188 households. Based on activity variables, 
four latent profiles of livelihood strategies were identified, which were related to capital asset 
endowment and income share variables. The results show that there was not a clear gap between 
cultivation of CN and CCN-51, as 60% of the sampled households simultaneously grew both 
varieties. The results indicate that the variable “share of land allocated to CN” does not 
significantly contribute to discriminating among profiles. Households with a low share of land 
allocated to CCN-51 showed higher income diversification strategies and vice versa. Our study 
also shows that the lack of appropriate incentives may threaten the future cultivation of CN since 
the National policy for CN rehabilitation has had little impact on the more cacao-driven profiles 
that have a lower asset endowment. The design, structuring and maintenance of a domestic 
differentiated value chain for the CN variety, together with income diversification measures and 
prior improvement on the asset endowment of these profiles, seems to be the pathway to improve 
the livelihoods of small farmers and increase the success of the current policy for fine flavor cacao 
rehabilitation at the national level.  
 Keywords: rural livelihoods, three-step approach, latent profile analysis, specialized value 
chain, asset endowment. 
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1. Introduction 
Cacao is the world’s third most important agricultural export commodity and the second most 
important cash crop in the tropics (T. Blare & Useche, 2013; Galarza, 2012). It is estimated that 
more than 80% of cacao is produced by 7 to 8 million small family-managed cacao farms in over 
50 countries worldwide (ECLAC et al., 2015).  
The world cacao market distinguishes between two broad categories of cacao beans. Fine flavor 
cacao beans represent 5% to 10% of the total world market and can be sold for a premium because 
of their outstanding characteristics (Galarza, 2012; Melo & Hollader, 2013; ICCO, 2006 ). 
International demand for fine flavor cacao outweighs supplies, creating a potential attractive niche 
for its chain development at the national level, if certain additional incentives such as a price 
premium are appropriately distributed to all actors along the chain (Blare & Useche, 2013; ICCO, 
2012).  
Ecuador plays a major role in the world cacao market in terms of volume and quality, as it is the 
largest producer of fine flavor cacao, producing approximately 65% of the global supply (Blare 
& Useche, 2013; Squicciani & Swinnen, 2016; WFC, 2013). The fine cacao variety in Ecuador, 
known locally as cacao Nacional (CN), is grown in polyculture systems with other trees that 
produce timber and fruits and with other crops such as maize or soybeans. The modern hybrid 
CCN-51 is a full-sun variety that may double the productivity of its CN counterpart at the expense 
of being more demanding in the use of inputs (fertilizers or herbicides), among other key 
differences (Astudillo Paredes, 2014; Blare & Useche, 2013; Franzen & Mulder, 2007; MAGAP, 
2013; Ton et al., 2008). In the national Ecuadorian market, small farmers are paid the same price 
for both varieties. Since the small farmers do not perceive price premiums for CN, it is common 
that they combine both varieties (MAGAP, 2013). 
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The Ecuadorian cacao small farmers develop their activities in a general context characterized by 
low productivity, high concentration of assets and vulnerability of markets1 (SENPLADES, 
2017). Sectoral constraints include a lack of adequate grades and standards throughout the 
marketing chain, difficulties in accessing basic and extension services, inefficient articulation 
among authorities and support organizations with productive actors, aging trees with low 
productivity and resistance to disease and pests (Astudillo Paredes, 2014; Blare & Useche, 2013; 
Kooij, 2013; Lehmann & Springer-Heinze, 2014).  
Linking small farmers to higher-value markets has been perceived by governments, donors and 
NGOs as a way to reduce poverty among these vulnerable populations, either directly through 
increased incomes or employment or indirectly through spillover effects in local economies 
(Horton et al., 2016; UNIDO, 2011). Enhancing CN production is viewed as an economic 
development strategy (CORPEI-BID, 2009) that may contribute to alleviating poverty in rural 
communities, which reached 38.2% in Ecuador (INEC, 2016). Since 2009, the Ecuadorian 
government, along with local and international development organizations, has implemented the 
Project on Restoring CN cultivation (PRCN, hereafter). The assumption underpinning the design 
of this program is that protecting the quality of the CN variety and strengthening the linkages 
between producers, buyers and processors in local and international higher-value markets will 
lead to improvement of the living conditions of cacao producers. PRCN can be viewed as value 
chain development (VCD) to target poor and vulnerable populations upstream in the value chain 
and reduce poverty (Horton et al., 2016). However, these strategies have been criticized for the 
underlying assumption that the small holders to whom these policies are addressed do not face 
substantial trade-offs when using their resources to participate in these chains (Stoian et al., 2012; 
Ton et al., 2011). 
This study intends to cover a research gap on the trade-offs faced by small cacao farmers in 
Ecuador in the production of specialty (CN) vs. commodity (CCN-51) cacao and how these 
                                                     
1 Rural poverty by income is 38.2% whereas the multidimensional poverty rate is 59.9% and the rate of 
adequate employment is only 27.85% of the population (SENPLADES, 2017). 
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impact on their livelihoods. This overall aim is focused on two specific objectives. First, to 
determine the factors associated with the choice of livelihood strategies of small farmers in 
Ecuador linked to the cultivation of two varieties of cacao, CN and CCN-51, which have 
significantly different economic, social and environmental impacts. Second, to investigate the 
influences of the PRCN on the livelihoods of small farmers, including their capital asset 
endowments, activities, income shares and livelihood strategies. For this purpose, a detailed 
household survey was applied in nine cacao-producing villages in the Guayas, the largest cacao-
producing province in Ecuador. 
This study adopts the sustainable rural livelihoods and household livelihood strategy frameworks 
(Carney, 1999; Scoones, 1998; Jansen et al., 2006, Nielsen et al., 2013). Many studies have 
adopted these frameworks to determine the livelihood strategies rural farmers engage in to earn a 
living (outputs) and their relation with external variables such as capitals assets (inputs) or income 
(outcomes) (e.g., Alemayehu et al., 2018; Alemu, 2012; Browder et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2006; 
Fang et al., 2014; Hua et al., 2017; Jansen et al., 2006; Pichon, 1997; Walelign et al., 2016 
Bebbington, 1999; Bhandari, 2013;). 
Most of these studies determine the livelihood strategies of the sampled population (through 
principal component analysis, latent cluster analysis, or latent Markov cluster analysis). Then, 
different regression models are adopted (e.g., multinomial logit or ordinary least square models) 
to determine the relation of these strategies with external variables (Nguyen et al., 2015; Nielsen 
et al., 2013; Walelign & Jiao, 2017; Walelign et al., 2016). However, to our knowledge, an 
integrated assessment of strategies and external variables has not been performed.  
This study applies a novel variant of latent class analysis (LCA) known as improved three-step 
that allows for identification of groups or profiles in a population based on a set of observed 
variables and implicitly acknowledges that these profiles may relate to external variables (Bakk 
et al., 2013; Vermunt, 2010). LCA uses a probability-based classification, making it advantageous 
over traditional clustering techniques (Magidson & Vermunt, 2002). The three-step approach of 
LCA incorporates a correction procedure that avoids the downward-biased estimates of the 
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strength of the relationships between the profiles and external variables that may arise when these 
relationships are estimated simultaneously with the model identifying the latent variable (one-
step) or separately (three-step method without correction) (Bolck et al., 2004; Vermunt, 2010). 
This statistical approach also allows for analyzing the relationship between livelihood strategies, 
capital assets and incomes in a robust manner, more consistently aligned with the household 
livelihood strategy framework. To our knowledge, this approach has not been applied in the 
assessment of livelihood strategies.  
2. Theoretical framework: sustainable rural livelihoods and household livelihood strategy 
Drawing on the work of Walelign & Jiao (2017), this study is theoretically grounded in the 
conceptual frameworks of sustainable rural livelihoods (SRL) (Ellis, 2000; Scoones, 1998; 2015) 
and household livelihood strategy (HLS) (Jansen et al., 2006; Nielsen et al., 2013). The SRL 
describes the basis for livelihood analysis and the HLS elaborates upon the SRL and enables 
examination of the relationships between the different elements of the SRL framework to 
determine the different livelihood strategies that households undertake to earn a living.  
The SRL framework defines a sustainable livelihood as one that comprises the capabilities, assets 
(including material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living (R 
Chambers & Conway, 1992). A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from 
stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets while not undermining the 
natural resource base (Chambers & Conway, 1992, p. 5; Scoones, 1998, p. 6).  
The SRL framework (Carney, 1999; Scoones, 1998) links livelihood resources (designated here 
by the term capital assets) and outputs (livelihood strategies) to outcomes (e.g., income generated, 
wellbeing) (Scoones, 2009). Agricultural intensification (more output per unit area through 
capital investment or increases in labor inputs), agricultural extensification (more land under 
cultivation), livelihood diversification (diversifying to a range of off-farm income earning 
activities) and migration (seeking a livelihood elsewhere, either temporarily or permanently) are 
some of the broad strategies that rural households pursue to make their living (Scoones, 1998). 
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These input-output-outcome elements identified by the SRL framework are amenable to 
quantitative analysis of the livelihood strategies of rural households (I Scoones, 2009). The HLS 
framework quantifies livelihood strategies based on the portfolio of main activities that rural 
households undertake depending on the available assets (Babulo et al., 2008; Jansen et al., 2006; 
Nielsen et al., 2013; Winters et al., 2009). The strategies are directly and indirectly influenced by 
capital assets and the relevant contextual factors that generate specific outcomes such as income.  
Households in both frameworks constitute the basic unit of analysis (Ellis, 2000; Winters et al., 
2009; Nielsen et al., 2013; Walelign & Jiao, 2017) in which three closely connected components 
are assessed: activity variables, capital assets and outcomes. The latter two largely draw on the 
SRL framework and the definition of activity variables and the modeling approach adopted in this 
work align with the HLS framework. The variables are described in more detail below and are 
depicted in Figure 1 
2.1 Activity variables 
Activities are actions taken by the households to produce outcomes, which involve the use of a 
single asset or set of assets (Winters et al., 2009). Assessing the proportions of assets allocated by 
rural households to different income-generating activities is used as a grouping criteria so that 
households with similar asset allocation choices are grouped together in a livelihood strategy 
profile (Jansen et al., 2006; Nielsen et al., 2013; Hua et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2006; van den 
Berg, 2010).  
By using activity choices as criteria for livelihood strategy identification, the HLS framework 
circumvents some drawbacks related to the use of other grouping criteria. Many studies identified 
livelihood strategy groups based on absolute income or the share of income generated by different 
livelihood activities (Chilongo, 2014; Tesfaye et al., 2011; Walelign & Jiao, 2017; Zenteno et al., 
2103). However, this approach neglects that income per se is stochastic and does not reflect the 
amount of assets households have invested in different activities (van den Berg, 2010; Walelign 
& Jiao, 2017). For example, income shares from a particular year reflect a household’s short-term 
coping mechanisms rather than a long-term livelihood strategy (Jansen et al., 2006). Occupation-
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grouping criteria has a key downside, since it generally overlooks the fact that rural households, 
especially in developing countries, engage in a diverse range of activities (Davis et al., 2010; 
Walelign, 2016). Finally, the asset grouping-criteria may neglect that households combine assets 
to generate income from a portfolio of activities (Brown et al., 2006; van den Berg, 2010).  
The activity choice criteria applied in this study considers the household’s use of its main assets, 
i.e., land and labor (Jansen et al., 2006). We also included remittances to acknowledge one of the 
main criticisms of activity choice as a grouping criterion, since activities from nonproductive 
assets often play a key role in livelihood strategy selection in developing countries (Nielsen et al., 
2013; Walelign et al., 2016). A more detailed description of the activity variables used in this 
study is presented in section 3.2. 
2.2 Capital assets 
Capital assets may be seen as the building blocks for a household to choose its livelihood strategy 
(Ellis, 2000; Brown et al., 2006; Nguyen et al., 2015) and from which different productive streams 
are derived. These assets are tangible (resources and stores) or intangible (claims and access) and 
are commonly considered as composed of five types of capital: natural, human, social, financial, 
and physical.  
Natural capital includes all natural resource stocks and environmental services from which 
livelihoods are derived, including the central variables of access to farmland and its ownership. 
Physical capital includes the basic infrastructure and producer goods that are essential to support 
livelihoods (Bebbington, 1999; Bhandari, 2013; DFID, 1999). Infrastructural assets, such as 
roads, or production assets, such as vehicles or equipment that foster diversification of rural 
livelihoods (Amekawa, 2011; Ellis, 2000; Rakodi, 1999) are physical capital. Human capital 
comprises the amount and quality of labor available, skills, knowledge and health that enable 
individuals or households to pursue different livelihood strategies (DFID, 1999). Financial capital 
includes the stock of money available for households in the form of savings, credit, remittances, 
and pensions (Amekawa, 2011; Carney, 1998). Social capital arises from social relationships and 
describes the stock of reciprocity and trust embedded in the relations of individuals and 
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households with other actors and entities such as family, relatives, friends, organizations, and 
networks (Amekawa, 2011). It plays an important role in mediating people’s access to and 
utilization of other assets (Bebbington, 1999) and has recently been recognized as a significant 
component in understanding agricultural value chains (Abbey et al., 2016). 
In our study, these assets are mainly used to determine how varying capital assets influence 
livelihood strategies and evaluate the impact of PRCN policy on structuring the smaller 
producers` asset endowment and enabling their decisions toward adoption of the CN cacao 
variety. 
2.3 Outcome variables (income shares) 
The livelihood strategies pursued by households intend to achieve outcomes such as income, 
increased well-being, improved food security or social claims (Amekawa, 2011). Among these, 
income is the most commonly assessed outcome variable, partly because it is relatively 
straightforward to measure in absolute and relative terms (Jansen et al., 2006). Income is often 
perceived as a welfare gauge (Barrett et al., 2001), although some authors are reluctant to consider 
it as an outcome given the multidimensional nature of wellbeing (Alkire & Foster, 2011; 
Chambers, 1995; Ellis & Freeman, 2005). Household income analysis should include the values 
per income source (Walelign, 2016) for example, distinguishing between on-farm and off-farm 
income is crucial since the latter generally eases capital constraints and may contribute to higher 
farm production and income (Babatunde & Qaim, 2010; Chang & Mishra, 2008). 
In this study, the share of different income sources was assessed to determine the income mix of 
each livelihood strategy. It allowed for analysis of the degree of income source diversification of 
the livelihood strategies linked to varying cultivation intensities of the two cacao varieties. The 
relationship between the capital asset endowments that characterize less diversified strategies is 
also considered to suggest appropriate targets of intervention.   
2.4 Relationship between concepts 
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Livelihood activities link the capital assets to the ex post flow of income (Fig 1) and are subject 
to the endowment of livelihood capitals because they determine the possibilities for rural 
households to achieve goals related to revenue, safety, and welfare (Fang et al., 2014; van den 
Berg, 2010). Depending on their contexts, households harness the assets at their disposal in pursuit 
of livelihood strategies with a goal of maximizing livelihood outcomes (Amekawa, 2011; Nicol, 
2000; Scoones, 1998) (Brown et al., 2006; Fang et al., 2014). Livelihood activities geared toward 
market or subsistence and a particular asset mix allow for smallholder households to take 
advantage of new market opportunities and institutional constellations to respond to shocks, 
adverse trends and seasonality (Scoones, 2009; Sheck et al., 2013).  
Identifying what combination of livelihood assets is required for different livelihood strategy 
combinations is a key step in the analysis process. For example, successful agricultural 
intensification may combine access to natural capital (e.g., land, water) with economic capital 
(e.g., technology, credit) whereas, in other situations, social capital (e.g., labor sharing 
arrangements) may be more significant (Scoones, 1998).  
Operationalization of these concepts in the HLS framework is based on identification of groups 
of livelihood strategies based on activity variables; these strategies are first described based on 
the capital assets of the households (e.g., Jansen et al., 2006; Nielsen et al., 2013; van den Berg, 
2010) and act as predictors of income shares. The three-step approach adopted in this study allows 
for addressing the relationship of the livelihood strategy profiles with external variables (capital 
assets and income shares) in a robust manner. 
3. Case study description 
Ecuador’s cacao is produced almost exclusively by small farmers, for whom it represents a key 
source of income (Astudillo Paredes, 2014; Blare & Useche, 2014). 
Fine cacao is the source of high-end chocolate manufacturing. Its production is scarce (5% of the 
world’s cacao production) and it may obtain premiums of 30% (and even 60%) over ordinary 
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cacao beans in international markets (Blare and Useche, 2013; ICCO, 2012). Ecuador accounts 
for almost half of the world’s production of this variety (ICCO, 2006). 
Fine cacao is exclusively harvested from cacao Nacional (CN) trees (Melo & Hollander, 2013). 
The CN variety is considered part of the Ecuadorian identity (Kooij, 2013). It is typically 
produced in a shade-cultivation system (Bentley et al., 2004; Melo & Hollander, 2013) together 
with other tree crops that provide shade and, more importantly, products such as wood (e.g., laurel 
tree) or fruits such as mango, guayaba, citrus, plantain, or papaya (Coq-Huelva et al., 2018; Ofori-
Bah & Asafu-Adjaye, 2011). This complex of trees provides habitat for diverse fauna, 
contributing to meeting the consumption needs of small rural farmers. 
The shade production of cacao has been progressively substituted by the full-sun variety CCN-51 
accounted for 48% of plantings during early 2000s (Bentley et al., 2004; Ruf, 2011). CCN-51 is 
said to be the most productive variety of cacao worldwide, with a production potential of 
approximately 77 kg/ha. The production approach for CCN-51 is based on monoculture with high 
plantation densities. Its yields may reach almost four times those of CN (Galarza, 2012) and it is 
resistant to fungal diseases (Espinosa et al., 2006). However, this usually comes at the expense of 
increased use of fertilizers and herbicides (Clay, 2004), without which, productivity may decrease 
to 12-15 kg/ha with respect to the potential production (MAGAP, 2013). The productivity of both 
varieties can oscillate greatly depending on crop management. The survey conducted by Jano 
(2007) showed that farmers cultivating CCN-51 spent on average 77% more on pesticide 
applications and labor than farmers cultivating CN2. The CN production potential in the study 
region may reach 33 kg/ha and, with adequate management productivity, may reach an estimated 
40 kg/ha (MAGAP, 2013). Accordingly, management costs per hectare also greatly differ from 
$660/ha for CN to $820/ha for CCN-51. Even if CCN-51 allows for obtaining more cash income 
                                                     
2 However, in a more recent study conducted in northern Ecuador, Blare & Useche, 2013, estimated a 
difference of 19% in cultivation costs between both varieties, similar to the 24% estimate provided by 
MAGAP (2013) 
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than CN, in a season with low cacao harvest, households may face difficulty meeting their 
subsistence needs.  
The distinctively lower quality of the hybrid CCN-51 does not qualify its beans for fine cacao 
production and hence it cannot be sold at premium prices in the international markets like CN, 
whose unique flavor and aroma make it the base of the finest chocolates worldwide 
(PROECUADOR, 2013). Therefore, each variety has been commercialized through different 
value chains in the international markets and have their own regulations and prices. 
However, in the Ecuadorian national market, such differentiation is nonexistent and both varieties 
are sold in the same value chain. As a result, farmers receive the same remuneration for the two 
varieties, either at the farm gate or the local market. The national cacao value chain in Ecuador is 
rather long and exporters and intermediaries are the dominant actors that qualify quality, 
determine prices and establish market rules (Galarza, 2012; Jano, 2007; MAGAP, 2013; Useche 
& Blare, 2013).  
The average price of cacao beans in the Ecuadorian national market, where both varieties are sold 
at the same price, was $107 in 2016 and $77.02 in 2017 (SINAGAP, 2018). This is one of reason 
small farmers shifted from CN to CCN-51, since they are not rewarded for their effort to produce 
quality cacao (B. T. Blare & Useche, 2014; Collinson & León, 2000). The production decisions 
of small farmers linked to specialty markets such as the CN market significantly depend on 
incentives (economic and noneconomic) that are transmitted along the value chain (Jano, 2007). 
Since these benefits are not being transmitted, partly due to the absence of a specialty value chain 
at the national level, only the farmer associations that have circumvented intermediaries and sold 
directly to exporters or exported directly have achieved better prices (Astudillo Paredes, 2014; 
Jano, 2007). However, this constitutes a minority of cases in the sector. 
This lack of a price difference also represents an obstacle to avoiding the mixing of varieties that 
is currently a regular practice (MAGAP, 2013). Until 2004, intermediaries and exporters did not 
separate National from CCN-51 (Melo & Hollander, 2013). The lack of a monitoring system that 
enforced the homogenization of cacao quality or the segregation of different qualities (Jano & 
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Mainville, 2007) allowed for fine quality cacao manipulation. Thereby, some supply chain actors 
mixed bulk cacao beans with fine ones. The mixture was sold by intermediaries in the 
international markets as fine cacao to maximize their individual profits (Galarza, 2012). This 
mixing produced a reduction in quality and led to a downgrading of the Ecuadorian fine flavor 
cacao rating by the International Cacao Organization (ICCO) from 100% to 75% since 1994. In 
2005, possible future grading reductions were announced, motivating the involvement of the 
Ecuadorian state in the industry (see Melo and Hollander (2013) for a critique and description of 
the Ecuadorian cacao market). There is obviously a gap between the lack of differentiation in the 
local market and the efforts the country is making to overcome sanctions and promote fine cacao 
from Ecuador in international markets (Jano, 2007). Furthermore, the increased cultivation of 
CCN-51 reduces the opportunities of Ecuador as a big international player in the fine cacao 
market, since the quality of CCN-51 is not suitable for high-end chocolate manufacturing.  
The Ecuadorian government, along with local and international development organizations, 
initiated a project for CN restoration in 2011, which includes links with other organizations 
advocating for CN as an economic development strategy to alleviate poverty in rural communities 
(CORPEI-BID, 2009). The PRCN policy aims to revitalize its production through the 
improvement of current CN plantations and establishment of new ones. The project actions 
initially tackled the production and the value chain at large, aiming to develop a specific value 
chain for CN that would establish the incentive of a premium price at the farm-gate level (Jano, 
2007). The project implemented the creation of a germplasm bank, facilitated small farmers, 
provided technical and training assistance and strengthened farmers’ associations. However, the 
full display of PRCN has been jeopardized by a lack of financing and governmental changes; in 
recent years, the focus has been on providing technical assistance while value chain development 
for CN has not been implemented.  
Cacao production in Ecuador is primarily concentrated in the coastal-plain region, with 85% of 
the country’s total production. The Guayas account for 26% of the national production and is the 
largest cacao producing region (INEC, 2015). This study was conducted in nine rural sites in two 
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districts of the Guayas, Lorenzo de Garaicoa and Yaguachi Viejo, which represent 10% of the 
Guayas cacao production. Table 1 summarizes the principal statistics of the two districts.  
The study area belongs to the dry west woodland ecosystem, characterized by a tropical mega 
thermal climate with mild temperatures (25ºC – 30ºC) and abundant rainfall (2000 mm). CN and 
CCN-51 varieties at different cultivation intensities constitute the agricultural basis of these 
villages, complemented by other crops such as banana, sugar cane, soy, corn, tobacco and rice 
(GAD-Garaicoa, 2015; GAD-Yaguachi Viejo, 2015; INEC, 2015).  
The government has implemented the PRCN program in these nine rural sites since 2012 to 
stimulate farmers to switch from the CCN-51 variety to the CN variety. The CN variety is now 
cultivated at different intensities without full withdrawal of the hybrid variety. 
4. Material and Methods 
4.1 Modeling approach: the improved three-step approach 
Latent Class Analysis (LCA) was introduced by Lazarsfeld & Henry (1968) to derive latent 
attitude variables from responses to dichotomous survey items and was originally designed to be 
used with dichotomous observed variables or indicators. LCA allows for building typologies 
based on observed variables. The technique is helpful for researchers who seek to identify 
subgroups (i.e., latent classes) within large, heterogeneous populations (Tein et al., 2013). A 
review of the method and its evolution can be found in (Magidson & Vermunt, 2004).  
Different from cluster analysis techniques, LCA is a model-based approach. This means that a 
statistical model is postulated for the population from which the data sample is obtained. An 
advantage of using a statistical model is that the choice of the cluster criterion is less arbitrary and 
the approach includes rigorous statistical tests for the selection of a model with optimal 
(livelihood) classes (Magidson & Vermunt, 2002).  
 LCA involving continuous variables is also termed a latent profile model (Gibson, 1959; 
Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968), which is the focus of this study. Latent profile analysis (LPA) is a 
person-oriented analytic technique that identifies discrete profiles of individuals who share 
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similar response patterns across a set of indicator variables using probability-based classification 
(Collins & Lanza, 2010). Conceptually, it is similar to cluster analysis, but group membership is 
treated as latent rather than known and measurement error is allowed (Magidson & Vermunt, 
2002).  
Applications of LCA also investigate how the latent classes are related to external variables (Bakk 
et al, 2013). This is usually done in three steps: i) building a latent profile (LP) model for a set of 
response variables; ii) assigning individuals (households, in this study) to latent classes based on 
their livelihood profile membership probabilities and iii) investigating the association between 
the profile membership and external variables. 
The improved three-step approach (Bakk et al., 2013; Bakk & Oberski, 2014; Bakk et al., 2016; 
Vermunt, 2010) adopted in this study allows for examining the association between latent profile 
groups and external variables, acknowledging the uncertainty of group membership (Lanza et al., 
2013). 
First step: Estimating a Latent Profile (LP) Model 
Following Bakk & Oberski (2014), an LP model is estimated employing K observed indicator 
variables. Given a sample of n units, the vector of observations Yi is modeled as arising from T 
unobserved (latent) profiles X, 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡)𝑃(𝑌𝑖|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡)   (1)𝑇𝑡=1   
P(Xi = t) represents the probability of belonging to profile t and P(Yi|Xi = t) the probability of 
having a response pattern y conditional on belonging to profile t.  
The conditional probability of the ith response given the latent profile can then be written as a 
product of conditional item responses, where 𝑅𝑘 denotes the categories of responses to variable 
k, 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑘|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡) = ∏ ∏ 𝜋𝑘𝑡𝑟
𝐼(𝑌𝑖𝑘=𝑟)




𝑘=1         
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The first-step log-likelihood of the sample data L1 follows by assuming the independence of 
observations: 










𝑖=1    
Second step: calculating the profile membership of each unit  
Following Bakk et al. (2016), after estimating the latent profile model in the first step, a new 
variable W is created, assigning each unit (household, in our study) to an estimated profile. 
Following Bayes rule, each unit’s posterior probability of belonging to profile t is 
𝑃(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡|𝑌𝑖) =
𝑃(𝑋𝑖 = 𝑡)𝑃(𝑌𝑖|𝑋 = 𝑡)
𝑃(𝑌𝑖)
   (4) 
The true (X) and assigned (W) profile membership scores will differ. The classification errors 
must be calculated and the correction methods3 for the assignment variable W are applied in the 
third step. The posterior profile membership conditional on the true value can be expressed as: 
𝑃(𝑊 = 𝑠|𝑋 = t) =
1
𝑁




    (5) 
Third Step: Relating Estimated Profile Membership to External Variables (Covariates and Distal 
Outcomes) 
The third step of the approach relates the latent profiles to external variables. These act as 
predictors of the individual membership to the latent profiles, i.e., covariates. Alternatively, latent 
profiles can act as predictors of external variables, i.e., distal outcomes.  
Following Bakk et al. (2016), the assigned classification W is related to a vector of covariates, Z, 
while also correcting for the classification error in W. P(X= t|Zi) and P(W= s|Zi) are related to 
each other, thus P(W= s|Zi) can be written as a weighted sum of the latent profiles given the 
covariates, with the classification error probabilities as the weights: 
                                                     
3 For more details of correction methods applied, see Appendix A. 
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𝑍𝑖𝑞 denotes the value of subject i on one of the Q covariates and the structural part of the model 
can be parametrized by means of a multinomial logistic regression model, 
𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑡|𝑍𝑖) =
exp (𝛽0𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑞𝑡𝑍𝑖𝑞)
𝑄
𝑞=1





   (7) 
Below, we present the three-step model with external variables that are predictors of latent profile 
membership (Bakk et al., 2013). The parameters of interest are the logistic regression coefficients 
𝛽𝑞𝑡, gathered in the vector 𝜃3. Consistent estimates 𝜃3 can be obtained by maximizing the third-
step log-likelihood (Vermunt, 2010), 








4.2 Variables employed and their connection with the improved three-step approach 
In this study, we identified three sets of variables: i) activity variables that measure the latent 
profiles, ii) capital asset variables (covariates) that predict household membership to the latent 
profiles of livelihood strategies and iii) income share variables (distal outcomes) that are predicted 
by the latent profiles. Once the entire sample is grouped into livelihood strategy groups based on 
activity variables, the membership of each of the sampled households to these groups or profiles 
can be explained based on a set of predetermined capital asset-based variables (Jansen et al. 2006) 
that encompass the five main types of capital. Finally, the income share of each profile is assessed, 
considering it as a distal outcome (i.e., predicted by the livelihood profiles).  
Activity variables to identify the livelihood strategy profiles  
Drawing on the SRL and HLS approaches, identification of livelihood strategies was based on 
eight activity variables. Five correspond to labor allocation and two variables refer to land 
allocation, which are the main productive assets that small farmers typically allocate into income-
generating activities (Jansen et al., 2006; van den Berg, 2010). The transfer income variable 
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accounts for income generated from nonproductive assets. The activity variables are shown in 
Table 2. 
In relation to labor, we considered the proportion of family labor allocation to on-farm and off-
farm activities (agriculture and non-agriculture related), and the proportion of external workforce 
hired. Disentangling on-farm and off-farm work is highly relevant, since strategies that combine 
both tend to earn higher incomes (Jansen et al., 2006).We also identified temporary and permanent 
modalities of on-farm and off-farm employment.  
We identified the share of land allocated to CN and CCN-51 varieties that form the agricultural 
basis of the farmers in the study to assess the influence of these crops in shaping livelihood 
strategies and determine whether the PRCN has influenced the livelihood of these households.  
Capital asset variables as covariates to predict household membership to the livelihood strategy 
profiles  
After identifying the livelihood profiles, we examine the association between capital asset 
variables and livelihood profile membership. 
The five types of capital assets were measured considering a wide range of variables and some 
built-in indexes (Table 2). Natural capital was measured considering both access to and ownership 
of land (Jansen et al., 2006). Two built-in indexes were considered to address the physical capital 
dimension, in which higher values represent higher access and therefore more physical capital. 
The production index measured access to machinery, storing installations and transportation and 
the basic services index measured access to drinking water, health and education. Family size and 
the educational level of the head of the household were proxies employed to measure the human 
capital dimension. Financial capital was assessed through the households’ savings and debts. 
Finally, social capital was measured considering membership in rural cooperatives. 
The five types of capital variables are entered in the model as predictors (covariates) of household 
membership to each profile, allowing for determining the asset mixes that characterize the 
different livelihood strategies. This procedure is equivalent to using a multinomial logistic 
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regression model, except that the three-step approach estimates classification errors when 
assigning profile membership and then corrects them by maximum-likelihood adjustment before 
the regression is applied (Bakk et al., 2013; Bakk et al., 2016; Vermunt, 2010). 
Income share variables as distal outcomes of livelihood profiles 
A pilot questionnaire served to establish the household's main income sources over the past two 
years. In the final survey, farmers were requested to indicate the proportion of income from the 
following sources: on-farm activities, off-farm agricultural activities, off-farm non-agricultural 
activities and non-agricultural self-employment activities (Table 2).  
We examined the association between income shares and livelihood profiles by employing the 
profiles as predictors of income shares (distal outcomes), acknowledging that income sources are 
outcomes rather than determinants of livelihood strategies (van den Berg, 2010). 
5. Data collection 
A detailed household survey was conducted from December 2015 to April 2016. Data collection 
and handling followed the Poverty Environment Network (PEN) survey guidelines that were 
designed to measure income and livelihood patterns (Angelsen et al, 2011; PEN, 2015). The PEN 
prototype questionnaires were translated into Spanish and thoroughly field tested at nine rural 
sites before operationalization.  
Meetings were initially held with presidents of the cooperatives and communities in each area to 
explain the goals and methodology of the study. A survey schedule was prepared so that heads of 
the households were randomly selected across the nine villages and summoned on the agreed 
upon date to complete the questionnaire. Each interview lasted approximately 45 minutes. 188 
heads of randomly sampled households were interviewed. 
The final questionnaire was divided into three sections. The first recorded household activity 
variables, the second section collected data about household income shares and the third section 
compiled information about capital assets. 
6. Results 
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Using the three-step approach adopted in this study, an LPA model was estimated to identify 
typologies of rural households that exhibited similar patterns of livelihood strategy. Capital asset 
variables are entered in the model as predictors of household membership to each livelihood 
strategy profile, describing the capital mix in each of the profiles that enables the choice of that 
livelihood strategy. Finally, the profiles are employed as predictors of income shares4.  
6.1 Profiles of livelihood strategies 
A four-profile model performed the best, according to Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), 
Consistent Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC) and conditional bootstrap tests (see Table 3 and 
for more details of the application of these criterions see Appendix A). Table 4 shows mean 
values, standard deviations and the overall Wald test for each profile activity variable and the size 
and name of each profile. All activity variables contributed significantly to discriminating among 
the profiles (p<0.05), except for transfer income and the CN variable, meaning that the land share 
devoted to CN cultivation does not contribute to discriminating between profiles. 
Profile 1 (P1) accounts for 37% of the sample, followed by profile 2 (P2), with 31% of the 
observations, and profiles 3 (P3) and 4 (P4) comprised approximately 15% of the sample each.  
P1 farms allocate approximately half of their land to cacao cultivation with a similar share of land 
allocated to CCN-51 (M=0.32) and CN (M=0.28), and were the group with the largest share of 
land devoted to the former. Labor on the farm mostly relies on family members (M=0.67) and 
off-farm family labor (M=0.04) and on-farm nonfamily labor (M=0.03) were irrelevant. This 
pattern indicates that, despite the government support given to the CN variety, CCN-51 is still 
important for certain farmers. Households in P1 can be framed within a strategy of agricultural 
intensification based on cacao, in which the intensification pattern relies on family workforce 
resources. We hypothesize that the lower labor requirements to cultivate CCN-51 allow for this 
                                                     
4 These analyses were estimated with Latent Gold 5.1 software (Vermunt & Magidson, 2015). 
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profile to manage both varieties exclusively with the family workforce. We named this group 
agricultural intensification based on family workforce. 
P2 is the most cacao-oriented profile, with two thirds of the farm land devoted to this crop. Despite 
having a similar share of land devoted to cacao as P1, the land allocated to CN is double the land 
share of CCN-51 (M=0.41 versus M=0.24). They make the most intensive use of family labor 
among the four profiles (M=0.79) and rely on hired workforce (M=0.56) and off-farm family 
labor (M=0.08) is irrelevant. This pattern is typical in small farms with intensive production of 
cacao and in which there is a high use of labor and minimal linkage to other agricultural and non-
agricultural activities. Households in P2 can easily be identified with a strategy of agricultural 
intensification based on CN cultivation. We named this group agricultural intensification based 
on family and external workforce. 
P3 is the most CN-specialized profile (M=0.44), with marginal participation of CCN-51 (M=0.08) 
and higher productive diversification than the other groups, dedicating almost 50% of its land to 
other permanent and temporary crops. This is linked to the standard cultivation procedure for CN, 
which intermixes other tree crops in polyculture agroforestry. On-farm family labor (M= 0.58) is 
as important as off-farm family labor (M=0.55), with permanent employment (M= 0.57) as the 
main modality for the latter case. Households in P3 follow a strategy of diversification in both 
crop production and family labor. We named this group diversified crop and family labor. 
P4 also shows specialization in the CN variety (M=0.41) but, in contrast to previous groups, it 
shows a high proportion of labor in all researched alternatives: family labor on- and off-farm 
(M=0.65) (as the group with the highest share of the latter), and external workforce (M=0.52). 
This high percentage of external workforce may indicate more business-oriented activity in this 
group. Temporary employment is the main modality of labor off-farm (M=0.63) and on-farm 
(M=0.82). Households in P4 show a distinctive strategy of labor diversification that led us to 
name it labor diversification. 
The land allocation to CN and CCN-51 and, more importantly, labor allocation to its different 
modalities led to identification of four clear patterns of livelihood strategies. The first two are 
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based on agricultural intensification strategies that rely on family resources or hiring an external 
workforce to achieve their production objectives. In contrast, profiles 3 and 4 adopt a distinctive 
diversification strategy; P3 includes bidimensional crop and family labor diversification and P4 
is based on labor diversification, with family members working on- and off-farm and reliance on 
external workers.   
Although there is no data available on the labor per hectare needed to manage each cacao variety, 
our results show that increases in land cultivation of 1% for each variety imply increases in family 
and total labor of 2% for CN cultivation and 1.75% for CCN-51. 
Considering the influence of the PRCN policy in promoting CN cultivation, especially among 
small farmers, cultivation of CN does not significantly contribute to shaping the membership of 
households to any of the profiles. Furthermore, among P1 and P2, which comprise two-thirds of 
the sampled households and who are the more agriculture-oriented households, the CCN-51 
variety continues to be highly preferred. These results show that the policy intervention focused 
on crop management assistance (e.g., pruning, seed selection, technical assistance) is not 
obtaining the intended results of increasing CN cultivation. This evidences the mismatch between 
the main theoretical beneficiaries of the PRCN (the small farmers in profiles 1 and 2) and their 
practices. P3 and P4, which are the profiles favoring CN, show a diversification livelihood 
strategy. Supporting farmer diversification (either in terms of crops or labor), may be considered 
by the PRCN as an indirect but effective way of achieving an increase in CN cultivation. However, 
these results also indicate that CN cultivation may be a residue in a slow process of tree 
replacement, with a slower pace in P3 and P4, since household strategies in these profiles are 
oriented toward obtaining non-agricultural income and have lower investments in improving  
cacao production5. In addition, the results highlight the need for creating a value chain for the CN 
variety in which external incentives such as premium prices are also distributed among small 
producers. 
                                                     
5 We are indebted to one of the reviewers of this manuscript for noting this. 
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6.2 Capital asset variables as predictors of membership to the livelihood strategy profiles 
All capital asset mix variables were significant predictors of livelihood strategy profile 
memberships (overall Wald test with p<0.05). At this stage and, similar to other works (Nielsen 
et al., 2013), a baseline group is defined against which the other strategies are compared to assess 
the role of capital assets in defining the profiles (see Table 5). First, the profile with the highest 
share of CC-N51 (P1) was taken as a baseline to pivot P2, P3 and P4. In a second phase, P2 (with 
more intensive on-farm family labor and cacao land share) was taken as a baseline to compare P3 
and P4. See Appendix A for more info. 
In the first pivotal comparison, households belonging to farmer associations are more likely to 
belong to P2 whereas those with larger family size and a primary education are more likely to be 
in P3. P4 shows significantly different capital assets than P1; medium and large farms are more 
likely to belong to P4 and being the owner of the land reduces the probability of being in this 
group. Furthermore, having a positive and relatively high capital production index increases a 
household’s likelihood of being in P4 and a low basic service index decreases the likelihood. 
Finally, having savings and low debt also increases the probabilities of being in P4.  
The second pivotal comparison shows that the probability of belonging to P3 or P4 with respect 
to P2 increases with land size and decreases with land ownership. In addition, the larger the family 
size, the more likely the household belongs to the P3 or P4 profiles. Households with primary 
education are more likely to belong to P3. Finally, having savings and low debt also increases the 
probability of being in P4.  
Examining the role played by different capital assets in defining the profiles, we observe that 
natural capital, specifically, the area of cultivated land, and human capital (family size) play 
determinant roles in enabling diversification strategies (either P3 or P4). Households with 
agricultural intensification strategies (P1 and P2) are small families that own and cultivate small 
properties whereas the diversification strategies (P3 and P4) are characterized by larger family 
sizes and hiring strategies to cultivate larger size plots.  
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Households in P2 appear to be the most vulnerable, with low natural capital and financial 
indicators (i.e., small land area and financial debts). Social capital through membership in 
farmers’ cooperatives is significant in defining membership to this profile. This may be a strategy 
to balance and reduce natural and financial vulnerability. In contrast, households in P4 have 
distinctively high physical capital (i.e., good access to production implements and basic services) 
and financial capital (savings and low debt).  
The low endowment of key assets that characterizes profiles 1 and 2 may explain why these 
farmers do not prioritize CN in their farms and continue to maintain relatively high levels of CCN-
51, contrary to the farmers with better asset endowments in profiles 3 and 4. As some studies 
show, both endowment and the wise use of such assets permit responding to the shocks, adverse 
trends and seasonality that characterize rural activities and better addressing risk decisions, 
especially for small farmers (Scoones, 2009; Sheck et al., 2013). With a low endowment of assets 
and without major incentives, the higher productivity of CCN-51 continues to be an important 
factor in the production decisions of these farmers. 
The national policy to stimulate the production of CN has a two-fold objective to improve the 
competitiveness of Ecuadorian cacao in global markets and to reduce the poverty of small farmers 
through premium prices obtained for CN beans (MAGAP, 2013). However, the former objective 
has not been achieved since premium prices for farmers are not in place in the national markets, 
as the PRCN policy focused on improving cultivation procedures. Although we do not have ex 
ante data to measure the impacts of PRCN policy on the asset endowment of profiles 3 and 4, it 
is relevant to signal that the small farmers in the study area on whom many PRCN policies are 
focused, profiles 1 and 2, are currently the least endowed with assets. This adds to evidence of 
the mismatch between the main theoretical beneficiaries of the PRCN policy (small farmers in 
profiles 1 and 2) and their current situation in terms of asset endowment. 
6.3 Income share predictions by livelihood strategy profiles  
We computed the profile-specific means for income share variables related to four labor types 
(see Table 6). The overall Wald test was significant for three of them: on-farm agricultural 
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activities, off-farm non-agricultural activities and off-farm agricultural activities (see Appendix 
A for additional information on the statistical tests). 
The income share results align with the findings of the livelihood strategy identification in which 
P1 and P2 clearly differentiate from P3 and P4. The income share from on-farm agricultural 
activities represents the largest proportion for all groups. However, it differs among them; P1 and 
P2’s own-farm income source represents more than 70% of their total income whereas its 
importance is somewhat less (approximately 50%) for P3 and P4, showing a more diversified 
income structure. Differences were also observed between these two groups regarding the second-
most important source of income. For farmers in P3, it is off-farm agricultural activities (21%) 
whereas for farmers in P4, it is off-farm non-agricultural activities (23%). 
These differences between the two groups of profiles reflect the vulnerable condition of the cacao 
producers in profiles 1 and 2 whose household income is highly dependent on the behavior of the 
cacao market.  
These profiles appear to be in a setup in which the intensive labor dedication to cacao cultivation 
and a low endowment of assets may jeopardize their access to less vulnerable livelihood 
strategies. Increasing their asset endowment and share of CN cultivation (and hence dependency), 
as intended by the PRCN policy, may not necessarily result in improvement of their income status, 
especially while lacking a differentiated value chain for CN at the national level that rewards 
farmers with higher prices. This result adds to previous evidence signaling the existing gap 
between the objectives of the PRCN policy to improve the situation of small farmers and the 
actual results. 
7. Discussion 
Small farmers face some opposing goals and trade-offs when cultivating cacao. CN may accrue 
premium prices in international specialty markets, and full-sun, high-yield CCN-51 benefits from 
less labor but relies more on external inputs and obtains lower prices (Franzen & Mulder, 2007). 
Most studies assessing the role of these two varieties and their distinctive implications in terms 
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of ecosystem service provision, cultivation or market access suggest that farmers would opt for 
one or the other variety (Andres et al., 2016; Jano & Mainville, 2007; Ton et al., 2008; Vaast & 
Somarriba, 2014). In contrast, our survey shows that more than two thirds of the sampled 
households (P1 and P2), specifically those showing livelihood strategies focused on agricultural 
intensification, solve this “dilemma” by allocating a substantial share of their land to concurrent 
cultivation of CN and CCN-51. Furthermore, the variable “share of land allocated to CN” does 
not significantly contribute to the adoption of a particular household livelihood strategy.  
Our results show how the asset endowment of small farmers affects their livelihood strategies; 
two broad patterns can be disentangled. Profiles P1 and P2 are highly dependent on their 
agricultural production whereas P3 and P4 show a more diversified farm economy. 
Diversification toward off-farm activities is a key strategy in rural livelihoods (Hua & Zhang, 
2017; Nielsen et al., 2013; Walelign, 2016) since it may reduce vulnerabilities to prevailing 
agricultural risk (Davis, 2006; Kandulu et al., 2012) and is generally a viable strategy for 
improving living standards in rural areas (Nielsen et al., 2013; Walelign et al., 2016). Profiles that 
were less diversified toward off-farm activities also had the highest share of land devoted to CCN-
51 production and vice versa. However, high welfare strategies tend to be associated with high 
levels of capital (van den Berg, 2010), as our study also supports. 
Labor is a building block in acquiring livelihood objectives and sustaining livelihood outcomes 
(Bhandari, 2013) and its analysis shows how P2 farmers rely on external workers to support their 
farm activities. The P2 group allocated more land to cacao production and a substantial share to 
CN. CN cultivation requires more labor whereas households that produce CCN-51 substitute 
labor with other inputs, especially herbicides (Bentley et al., 2004; Franzen & Mulder, 2007; Blare 
& Useche, 2013). Therefore, for less diversified livelihood strategies, cultivation of CCN-51 may 
be viewed as a way to obtain benefits in the short-term and reduce the need to hire an external 
workforce.  
Similar to other studies, cultivated land resource endowment was a key factor influencing the 
differentiation of livelihood strategies (Hua et al., 2017; Jansen et al., 2006; Winters et al., 2009). 
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A high allocation of land resource endowments to CN production (approximately 40%) and 
marginal land allocated to CCN-51 indicates a pathway of off-farm income diversification. Large 
farmers tend to have better access to economic/financial capital and can afford to purchase 
modern farm inputs that allow for them to strengthen their livelihood (Bhandari, 2013). 
Households in P4 can easily be identified with this pattern, showing positive and significant 
values for medium and large property sizes, a positive and significant production implements 
index compared to P1 and a diversified economy with off-farm income based on non-agricultural 
activities. In addition, our results show that access to the land, not land ownership, is the key 
factor contributing to engaging in higher income opportunities (Jansen et al., 2006; van den Berg, 
2010).  
Human assets enable households to pursue different livelihood strategies to achieve their 
livelihood objectives (Bhandari, 2013). Family size plays a crucial role in this respect since larger 
families are able to pursue non-agricultural livelihood strategies due to their higher labor capacity 
(Hua et al., 2017). P3 and P4 show distinctively larger family sizes than P2, translating into 
increased labor capacity and greater ability to diversify income sources. Some studies also suggest 
that family size positively impacts the adoption of innovations in crop management and restoring 
CN cultivation (Tiwari et al., 2008).  
The importance of cacao as a major global commodity makes the establishment of effective cacao 
policy a high priority (Franzen & Mulder, 2007); our findings may contribute to shaping current 
implementation of PRCN policy as well as future policies in Ecuador. Through PRCN policy, the 
Ecuadorian government has focused on developing measures related to agronomic issues in CN 
production and disregarded other factors that shape cacao production and commercialization 
(Astudillo Paredes, 2014). The lack of a differentiated value chain for CN at the national level 
impedes farmers from receiving differentiated prices for CN beans. Some farmer associations in 
Ecuador have achieved better prices for CN by circumventing the intermediaries and selling 
directly to exporters or exporting directly (Astudillo Paredes, 2014; Jano & Mainville, 2007). 
Thus, strengthening the role and capacity of farm cooperatives may be a successful approach to 
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reinforcing the ability of CN farmers to obtain premium prices in international markets. However, 
strategies that intend to link small farmers to markets tend to implicitly assume that these farmers 
have sufficient assets to participate in high-value markets and can assume higher risks for their 
investments, overlooking the trade-offs they incur (Donovan et al., 2015; Horton et al., 2016).  
Without such asset endowments, cacao farmers are constrained by entry barriers (Amekawa, 
2011) and income diversification measures may be detrimental for these families if their 
household asset stocks and feasible activity options are neglected (Amekawa, 2011; Barrett et al., 
2001). Development interventions that would allow for them to effectively participate in value 
chains would support poor households in building a minimum stock of productive assets, without 
which the poorest may experience asset depletion and increased vulnerability (Donovan & Poole, 
2013; Sheck, et al., 2013).  
Since asset thresholds are key to improving poverty transitions (Mutenje et al., 2010; Scoones, 
2015; Walelign, 2016), national policies oriented toward reducing the poverty of cacao small 
holders should consider increasing cacao productivity and investments in infrastructure and social 
safety nets to develop sustainable livelihoods (Bhandari, 2013; Davis & Lopez-Carr, 2014; Mahdi 
et al., 2016; Mbaiwa, 2011; Park et al., 2012; Reenberg et al., 2013; Timmer, 2012) 
However, the measures implemented through PRCN have not provided the small farmers who are 
focus of this policy with key asset endowments to support them in the case of allocating more 
land to the less productive CN variety, which results in the same prices as CCN-51 in the national 
markets they have access to. 
For CN cultivation, to create a real impact on the small farmers, it is necessary to establish a 
differentiated value chain for the CN variety at the national level in which external incentives 
such as premium prices are distributed among small producers. The lack of this value chain may 
limit the future viability of CN cultivation in Ecuador.  
Since our study analyzed household livelihood strategies at a given moment in time, several 
hypotheses can be considered to understand the dynamic allocation of land to the two cacao 
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varieties. Farmers who are more dependent on on-farm income are the largest producers of CCN-
51; probably because shifting completely to CN may be seen as a risk when they receive the same 
price for both varieties. The short-term benefits of cultivating CCN-51 allowed for its spread 
(Franzen & Mulder, 2007; MAGAP, 2013; Melo & Hollander, 2013), but it appears that many 
farmers acknowledge the benefits of combining CN cultivation with other tree crops that are key 
for family subsistence and the lower maintenance costs of this variety. In addition, cultivation of 
both varieties by agricultural intensification profiles may be a resilience strategy in case of plant 
diseases, pests or plagues. Finally, the higher share of CN observed in the more diversified 
profiles may indicate a higher capacity to adopt innovations in CN cultivation or CN may be a 
residue in the process of replacing trees, which occurs a slower pace in these profiles due to their 
prioritization of non-agricultural incomes. Further adoption of CN or halting its substitution 
process could be enhanced by creation of a value chain and improvement of the asset endowment 
of small farmers.  
The nonsignificant role played by the CN land cultivation in differentiating livelihood strategies 
and the lower asset endowment income diversification of the theoretical target beneficiaries of 
the PRCN highlight the gap between the postulates of this policy and the actual results. 
This work builds on previous studies assessing Ecuadorian cacao production (e.g., Galarza, 2012; 
Melo & Hollander, 2013; Useche & Blare, 2013) and adopts a robust statistical approach aligned 
with the theoretical frameworks adopted to investigate livelihood strategy profiles. Different from 
traditional cluster analysis (Babulo et al., 2008; Nielsen et al., 2013; Walelign, 2016), the 
improved three-step approach allows for more statistically robust and less arbitrary final grouping 
and profile assignment (Collins & Lanza, 2010; Magidson & Vermunt, 2002; Bolck et al., 2004).  
8. Conclusions 
Establishment of effective policies to improve cacao cultivation is viewed as a way to enhance 
the livelihood of small producers. Ecuador, as the largest global producer of fine flavor cacao 
(CN), has developed a national policy (PRCN) to rehabilitate and stimulate production of the CN 
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variety over its hybrid counterpart (CCN-51) to preserve the former and adopt its cultivation as a 
rural development strategy for cacao small farmers.  
The production decisions of small farmers occur in a context of diversified livelihood strategies 
in which they make decisions related to their linkage to markets for specialized or bulk cacao 
varieties. This study shows that fine flavor cacao does not insure the living conditions of small 
farmers that would enable them to opt for a specific livelihood strategy. In contrast, the capital 
assets significantly determine the livelihood strategies of small farmers. Low capital asset 
endowments hinder transitioning toward more rewarding livelihood strategies. Accordingly, 
policy interventions should be oriented to enhancing access to quality asset endowments and 
providing asset protection for small farmers. 
In the context of diversified livelihood strategies, policy interventions should also focus on 
measures to facilitate income diversification and improved opportunities for off-farm 
employment, as they may encourage adoption of CN by small producers 
The mismatch identified by this study between the PRCN policy and its theoretical beneficiaries, 
small cacao farmers, also calls for policies that design, structure and maintain a differentiated 
national value chain for the fine flavor variety. Ensuring that small farmers receive the incentives 
that accompany this variety, such as the premium prices obtained in international markets, would 
contribute to securing the mid-term viability of CN and the potential of this crop to enable access 
of small farmers to more rewarding livelihood strategies. 
This study advocates for a multidimensional policy strategy to promote fine flavor cacao 
cultivation, in which improved asset endowment, income diversification measures and 
development of a specific national value chain should accompany the improved CN breeding and 
management.  
Finally, in the framework of policy interventions, longitudinal data collection and analysis could 
improve assessment of the pathways that the livelihood strategies of small cacao farmers follow 
over time under the application of specific sectorial policies. 
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Figure 1. The three-step approach methodology adapted to the household livelihood strategy framework. Source: authors’ elaboration on Magidson 
Vermunt (2015) and Nielsen et al. (2013). First step: Activity variables (land and labor) measure the livelihood strategies. Second step: Capital asset variable 
covariates predict the profile membership of the households to the latent profiles. Third step: The latent profiles act as predictors of the income share variables.
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Viejo Full sample 
M SD M SD M SD Min. Max. 
Age (years) 48.47 13.94 54.19 15.36 50.23 14.59 18 86 
Gender (% female) 22.00 - 20.70   21.80 - - - 
Education (years) 8.03 4.52 8.38 3.89 5.33 4.01 0 15 
Household size  2.50 1.23 3.31 1.74 2.75 1.46 1 7 
Land area (ha) 4.99 6.46 4.49 3.48 4.96 5.79 0.38 47.5 
Married or living together (%) 70.0 - 74.10 - 71.30 - - - 
Nacional Cacao variety (ha) 1.23 2.45 2.56 2.26 1.64 2.46 0.20 12.00 
CCN-51 Cacao variety (ha) 1.23 2.30 0.17 0.74 0,9 2.02 0.45 13.50 
Permanent crops (ha) 0.71 1.66 0.76 2.06 0.73 1.79 0 13.50 
Other crops (ha) 1.81 4.98 0.84 1.61 1.51 4.25 0 44.50 
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Table 2. Activity, income and asset variables 
Variable Description 
Activity variables  
On-farm family labor Household adults working on-farm/Total household adults 
Off-farm family labor Household adults working off-farm/Total household adults 
On-farm non-family labor External workers/Total on-farm workers 
Cacao Nacional CN Ha of CN/Total ha 
Hybrid cacao CCN-51 Ha of CCN-51/Total ha 
Transfer incomea 
The transfer income percentage of the total income. Transfer 
income/Total income 
Modality of off-farm 
family employmentb 
1= permanent employment, 2= temporary employment, 3= other 
forms of employment, 4= does not apply 
Modality of on-farm non-
family employmentc 
1= permanent employment, 2= temporary employment, 3= other 
forms of employment, 4= does not correspond 
Income share variables 
On-farm agricultural 
activities 
Income share of on-farm agricultural activities over total income 
Off-farm agricultural 
activities 
Income share of off-farm agricultural activities over total income 
Off-farm non-agricultural 
activities 




Income share of non-agricultural self-employment activities over 
total income 
Natural capital 
Land 1= < 3 ha, 2 = 3-6 ha, 3 = > 6 ha  
Own land The total amount of arable land owned by the household. 
Physical Capital   
Production implement 
indexd 
Measures the household possession of production implements. The 
larger the index, the greater the asset holding 
Basic services indexe 
Measures the access of households to basic services. The larger the 
index, the greater the access 
Human Capital   
Family size Adult income household members 
Education 
1=No education, 2=Primary education, 3=Secondary education 
and higher. 
Financial Capital   
Savings Dummy variable indicating possession or absence of savings  
Debt Dummy variable indicating possession or absence of debt 
Social Capital   
Farmer association Dummy variable indicating membership in rural cooperatives  
a Includes retirement pensions, remittances from family members residing abroad and Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano (a government cash transfer program) 
b Other forms of employment include jobs as payment for lending and mixtures of permanent and temporary 
work. Option 4 is selected when the household does not have adult members who labor outside of the farm 
c,d Access to productive assets: plow, storing installation and transport. 
e Access to basic services: drinking water, health and education.  
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Table 3. Fit statistics for models comprising 1 to 5 latent profiles 
VARIABLE 
PROFILE MODEL 
1 2 3 4 5 
Log-likelihood -2184.49 -2092.56 -2057.25 -2009.68 -1991.5 
Global measures-fit (1)   
     BIC 4992.12 4855.38 4831.90 4783.89 4794.66 
     AIC 4606.98 4441.11 4388.51 4311.37 4293.01 
     CAIC 5111.12 4983.38 4968.90 4929.89 4949.66 
Local measures-fit 
 
     max (BVR) 97.794 82.856 42.927 41.893 41.431 
Entropy-R2 1 0.9907 0.9541 0.9798 0.9348 
Class.Err. (CE) 0 0.0013 0.0166 0.0059 0.0395 
BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion 
AIC: Akaike’s Information Criterion 
CAIC: Consistent Akaike’s Information Criterion. 
BVR: Bivariate Residual.
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Table 4. Profiles of livelihood strategies 
a From overall Wald test. Superscripts correspond to profiles for which the data are significantly different at the 5% level. 
  







on family workforce 
Agricultural 
intensification based 
on family and external 
workforce 
Diversified crop and 
family labor 
Labor diversification 
Profile Size (%) 37% 31% 17% 15%     
 
M SD M SD M SD M SD     
On-farm family labor  0.67² 0.03  0.791,3,4 0.00 0.58² 0.00 0.65² 0.04 0.015 0.060 
Off-farm family labor  0.043,4 0.00 0.023,4 0.00 0.551,2 0.00 0.651,2 0.00 0.000 0.630 
On-farm nonfamily labor  0.032,4 0.00 0.561,3 0.00 0.032,4 0.00 0.521,3 0.00 0.000 0.717 
CN 0.28 0.16 0.41 0.16 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.55 0.580 0.026 
CCN-51  0.32³ 0.01 0.24³ 0.02 0.081,2 0.01 0.16 0.16 0.058 0.059 
Transfer income  0.12 0.38 0.08 0.38 0.12 0.41 0.08 0.39 0.690 0.008 
Modality of off-farm family employment 3.043,4 0.03 1.433,4 0.04 1.431,2 0.09 1.661,2 0.10 0.000 0.810 
  1. Permanent employment  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.57 0.09 0.36 0.09     
   2. Temporary employment  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.42 0.08 0.63 0.09     
   3. Other forms of employment  0.05  0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00     
   4. Does not apply  0.94  0.03 0.96 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02  0.02     
Modality of on-farm nonfamily employment  3.052,4  0.03 1.851,3 0.05 3.032,4 0.04 1.831,3 0.07 0.000 0.795 
   1. Permanent employment  0.00  0.00 0.16 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.07     
   2. Temporary employment  0.00  0.07 0.84 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.82 0.07     
   3. Other forms of employment  0.06  0.03 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.03 0.00 0.00     
   4. Does not correspond  0.94  0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01     
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Table 5. Capital asset variable prediction of household profile membership 
























Capital Asset variable β z-value β z-value β z-value β z-value β z-value 
Land  13.71 0.030 
   Less than 3 ha. 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 .   
   Between 3 and 6 ha. -0.09 -0.17 -0.29 -0.48 1.65 2.24 -0.21 -0.32 1.74 2.21     
   More than 6 ha -0.31 -0.34 1.57 1.66 3.38 2.64 1.88 2.31 3.69 2.95     
Land ownership  0.11 1.25 -0.08 -0.83 -0.38 -2.33 -0.19 -2.73 -0.49 -3.13 13.50 0.000 
Production implement index 0.46 1.67 -0.02 -0.06 0.85 2.37 -0.48 -1.62 0.39 1.07 8.18 0.040 
Basic services index -0.36 -1.77 -0.24 -0.99 -0.60 -2.77 0.11 0.41 -0.25 -0.99 8.69 0.030 




   No education 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 .   
   Primary education 1.47 1.58 54.80 95.32 0.87 0.65 56.73 96.16 -0.60 -0.48     
   Secondary education 0.39 0.43 53.48 0.00 -0.32 -0.24 56.49 0.00 -0.72 -0.56     
Savings  9.79 0.020 
   No 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 .   
   Yes 0.15 0.25 -0.21 -0.32 1.91 2.90 -0.36 -0.49 1.76 2.16     
Debt  10.05 0.020 
   No 0.00 . 0.00 . 0.00 . 0 . 0 .   
   Yes 0.80 1.75 0.48 0.81 -1.42 -2.02 -0.32 -0.54 -2.22 -2.94     
Farmer association  12.23 0.007 
   No 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 .   
   Yes 1.57 2.98 -0.22 -0.43 1.12 1.52 -1.78 -2.98 -0.46 -0.57     
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0.014 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.061 0.03 3.073 0.380 
1,2,3,4 Indicates the profiles are significantly different at the 5% level. 
Livelihood strategies of cacao producers in Ecuador: Effects of 
national policies to support cacao farmers and specialty cacao 
landraces 
Appendix A 
Latent profile analysis solution 
LPA was applied in an iterative process by progressively increasing the number of profiles as 
long as each profile had a sufficient number of households (minimum of 5% of the sample) to 
reduce ulterior errors in the estimates of the profiles with the external variables. The eight activity 
variables were used as the indicator variables of the LPA model. 
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) and Consistent Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC) 
information criterions suggested the 4-profile model fitted the data best, while Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) values dropped while increasing the number of profiles. Entropy 
values were always above 0.90 and showed the best results for 2-profile and 4-profile models, 
indicating adequate classification. These two profiles also showed the lower classification errors. 
A conditional bootstrap test was performed to assess the significance of the difference in the 
statistics associated with the 2 and 4-profiles models and indicated that the 4-profile model over 
performed to the 2-profile model. The 4-profile solution was chosen as the best-fit model since it 
provided the neatest difference among profiles and the most substantively interpretable results 
with a good balance between parsimony, fit and interpretability. The local independence also was 
tested. Its results and implications are show in Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. 
Correction methods 
Several correction methods have been proposed in the literature. In this article we applied two of 
them. For Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) with covariates we used a maximum likelihood (ML) 
approach that involves estimating the profile-specific means and variances by maximum 
likelihood (Bakk et al., 2013; Vermunt, 2010). For LPA with distal outcomes we used an approach 
based on the work of Bolck et al. (2004), and Vermunt (2010) known as improved BCH (Bolck, 
Croon, and Hagenaars), that involves performing a weighted ANOVA, with weights that are 
inversely related to the classification error probabilities (Bakk et al., 2013; Vermunt, 2010).  
Table A.1. Bivariate Residuals (BVR) of Activity variables for four-profile solution model 
 a) BVR without direct effects 
 Activity variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 On-farm family labor  .       
2 Off-farm family labor  2.078 .      
3 On-farm nonfamily labor  1.757 0.002 .     
4 CN 0.185 0.038 0.027 .    
5 CCN-51  0.258 0.084 0.020 41.893 .   
6 Transfer income  0.948 0.338 0.019 0.054 2.489 .  
7 Modality of off-farm family employment 0.000 0.489 0.005 0.310 0.529 0.020 . 
8 Modality of on-farm nonfamily employment 0.263 0.010 5.148 0.006 0.028 0.002 0.0367 
 
b) BVR with direct effects 
Activity variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 On-farm family labor  .       
2 Off-farm family labor  2.092  .      
3 On-farm nonfamily labor  1.759 0.002 .     
4 CN 0.181  0.027 0.026 .    
5 CCN-51  0.257  0.079 0.020 0.000 .   
6 Transfer income  0.950  0.332  0.019  0.054  2.503  .  
7 Modality of off-farm family employment 0.000 0.523 0.006  0.288  0.534 0.018 . 
8 Modality of on-farm nonfamily employment 0.263  0.010 5.150  0.007  0.027 0.002 0.037  
Note: in the 4-profile solution model, we also assessed if whether the indicators were mutually independent in each livelihood strategy (local independence) and 
we decided to which local dependencies should be freed relaxed by introducing direct effects among the indicators via the bivariate residuals (Vermunt, 2010). 
Only two pairwise variables showed BVRs above 3.84 (section a) We decided to free relax the local dependence between variables numbered 4 and 5, in contrast, 
we kept it between variables numbered 3 and 8 (section b) despite the fact that their BVR was statistically significant due to the BVR between these variables 
is reduced from 97.79 in the 1-class model to 5.15 in the 4-class model, meaning that the 4-class model explains almost completely (95%) their association. 
 
Table A.2.  Pairwise comparison of Income share  
Profiles comparison 
Income share variables 







 Wald p-value Wald p-value Wald p-value Wald p-value 
1 vs 2 1.8104 0.180 1.181 0.280 0.635 0.430 1.570 0.210 
1 vs 3 10.174 0.001 4.518 0.034 3.161 0.075 1.256 0.260 
1 vs 4 6.6452 0.010 0.239 0.630 5.526 0.019 2.876 0.090 
2 vs 3 19.053 0.000 5.837 0.016 7.230 0.007 0.010 0.920 
2 vs 4 13.790 0.000 0.441 0.510 11.161 0.000 0.825 0.360 



















Basic_services_index Family_size Education Savings Debt Farmers_association 
 
Wald p-value Wald p-value Wald p-value Wald p-value Wald p-value Wald p-value Wald p-value Wald p-value Wald p-value 
1 vs 2 0.116 0.940 1.556 0.210 2.790 0.095 3.134 0.077 2.148 0.140 6.463 0.039 0.063 0.800 3.052 0.081 8.873 0.003 
1 vs 3 4.626 0.099 0.689 0.410 0.004 0.950 0.980 0.320 5.573 0.018 3951.652 0.000 0.102 0.750 0.656 0.420 0.181 0.670 
1 vs 4 7.385 0.025 5.451 0.020 5.617 0.018 7.698 0.005 2.359 0.120 0.045 0,980 8.410 0,004 4.087 0.043 2.306 0.130 
2 vs 3 7.430 0.024 7.476 0.006 2.640 0.100 0.167 0.680 8.821 0.003 4057.776 0.000 0.241 0.620 0.287 0.590 8.858 0.003 
2 vs 4 8.780 0.012 9.787 0.002 1.141 0.290 0.982 0.320 4.481 0.034 0.289 0,870 4.646 0,031 8.611 0.003 0.323 0.570 
3 vs 4 5.569 0.062 3.977 0.046 5.573 0.018 1.673 0.200 0.140 0.710 2909.527 0.000 7.257 0,007 6.898 0.009 2.569 0.110 
